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Abstract-A remote password authentication scheme is a mechanism used to support a computer 
system to solve the privacy and security problems in a multi-user network. In this paper, we will 
propose a new remote password authentication scheme without password tables. By using our scheme, 
each legal user has his/her identity, password and smart card. Using his/her identity, password and 
smart card, the computer system can validate whether the login user is a legal one or not. In our 
scheme, intruders cannot derive any secret information from the public information. Besides, intruders 
are not able to find any password from previous intercepted messages. Also, the new scheme can 
withstand replaying attacks. 
Keywords-password authentication, Remote password authentication, Smart cards, Discrete 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In multi-user networks, the users of networks share the expensive resources and can communicate 
with each other. Although networking brings convenience to us, there exists privacy and security 
problems for the computer system. There are many authentication mechanisms which support 
solving the privacy and security problems for the computer system. Among them, password 
authentication schemes are the most popular and inexpensive mechanisms used in many systems. 
In password authentication schemes, each user owns his/her identity and password. When 
he/she wants to login the computer system, he/she keys in his/her identity and password by 
himself/herself. The computer system can verify whether the login request is legal or not. There 
are many password authentication schemes [l-7]. 
Though a remote password authentication scheme is also a password authentication scheme, 
the system should take care of some other security problems. In remote password authentication 
schemes, the communication links among login points and the system are long and insecure. 
Secret passwords should not be transmitted in their plaintext forms; otherwise, passwords may 
be intercepted by an intruder. It is very dangerous for the system and the login user. Since 
transmitting messages can be easily intercepted by anyone, a replaying attack with the previous 
intercepted login message can be done. The remote password authentication schemes should 
withstand this attack. 
In 1981, Lamport [8] proposed a remote password authentication scheme which can withstand 
replaying attacks, but the scheme is insecure if intruders can modify the passwords stored in the 
computer system. Later, another scheme based on a signature scheme of a public key cryptosys- 
tern was proposed by Denning [9], but the scheme still needed password tables. In 1991, Chang 
and Wu [4] proposed a remote password authentication scheme with smart cards. In [4], they 
apply the Chinese remainder theorem to encrypt (decrypt) plaintext (ciphertext) to ciphertext 
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(plaintext). Excepting the password and identity, a smart card is also issued to each new user. 
A smart card contains a microprocessor, an I/O port, a RAM and a ROM [lo]. In their scheme, 
the system stores some information on the ROM of a smart card. 
One year later, Chang and Laih [2] broke Chang’s and Wu’s scheme. They assumed that the 
information stored on the smart card could be easily read out by a smart card holder. Using the 
public information of a smart card, the holder derives the secret decryption keys of the computer 
system. Therefore, he can find another user’s password by intercepting the login transmitting 
message. 
In this paper, we will propose a new remote password authentication scheme, which is more 
secure than the previous ones. Even if each smart card holder can obtain the information stored 
on smart cards, the secret information is still not released. On the other hand, the new scheme 
is also secure. In the next section, we will review Chang’s and Wu’s scheme, and Chang’s and 
Laih’s attack. The proposed scheme will be described in Section 3. In Section 4, the security 
analysis will be given. Finally, we will state some conclusions. 
2. A REVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH WORKS 
First, we review the remote password authentication scheme with smart cards proposed by 
Chang and Wu [4]. Unfortunately, the scheme was broken by Chang and Laih [2] later. So the 
attack of Chang and Laih will also be reviewed. 
Since Chang’s and Wu’s scheme is based upon the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), the 
theorem is given informally. Let dr, dz,, . . , d, and ml, m2,. . . , m, be 2n positive integers, where 
di and dj are relatively prime to each other for all i # j. There exists a constant C such that 
C zz ml mod dl, C G m2 mod d2, . . . , CEm,modd,. LetD=di*dz*...*d,. AconstantC 
among 0 and D - 1 can be found as follows: 
(1) Compute bi such that 
0 
f bi s 1 mod di for i = 1, 2,. . . , n. 
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The interested readers can refer to [II, pp. 16-181. 
Applying the CRT, a plaintext A4 = (ml, m2,. . . , m,) can be encrypted into a ciphertext C 
by the encryption keys ei, e2,. . , and e, as follows: 
mod D. 
Using the secret decryption keys dl, da,. . , and d,, the plaintext M = (ml, m2,. . . , m,) can be 
recovered as follows: 
ml = C mod dl, 
m2 = C mod da, 
and m, = C mod d,. 
Now, Chang’s and Wu’s scheme is described in the following. Let the secret decryption keys 
di, dz,. . . , d, be n large relative primes only known to the computer system. Suppose that f 
is a one way function and g(x) is a secret pseudorandom number generating function such that 
the value of g(x) is less than D. The purpose of the secret of g is that no one can determine the 
value of g(x) by a known z. Here, D and f are public. Chang’s and Wu’s scheme can be divided 
into three phases: initial phase, login phase, and authentication phase. 
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Initial Phase 
Suppose that a new user Vi submits his/her identity IDi to the computer system. The com- 
puter system generates a password PWi = (p~ii,pu~, . . . ,p~ri,) for the user Vi as follows: 
pij = g(1Di) mod dj for j = 1, 2,. . . , n. 
Deliver the password PWi and a smart card to the user Vi through a secure channel. The smart 
card contains the one way function f, the encryption keys (ei, e2,. . . , e,), and the product D. 
The smart cards held by each user are the same. 
Login Phase 
In order to login the system, the user U, inserts his/her smart card into the terminal and keys 
in his/her identity ID, and password PW, = (pwil,pwi2,. . ,pwin) by himself/herself. Then the 
smart card performs the following steps. 
STEP 1. Generate a random vector R = (~1, 73, . . . , T,). 
STEP 2. Compute t = (Cy=“=, eiri) mod D and vector S = (~1, ~2,. . . , s,) = (pWil,pWi2,. . . , 
PWin) + (Tl> T2, . . * > Tn) * f(t, T), where T is the current login date and time generated by the 
smart card. 
STEP 3. Transmit the authentication package P = {ID%, t, S, T} to the computer system. 
Authentication Phase 
After receiving the authentication package P, the computer system checks the format of identity 
first. Suppose that the system receives package P at T’ which represents the current date and 
time. The system tests whether (T’ - T) is less than t,he endurable time delay interval for 
transmission or not. If the login request passes the above two tests, the system checks whether 
the following equation holds or not: 
g(ID,) + tf(t,T) z 2 eiSi (mod D). 
i=l 
In 1992, Chang and Laih presented an attack to break Chang’s and Wu’s scheme. Now we intro- 
duce their attack. Since smart cards are held by legal users, they made a reasonable assumption 
that a legal user U’ can read the information f, (ei, e2,. . ,e,) and D from his/her smart card. 
He/she can derive the secret decryption keys (dl, d2, . . . , d,) by calculating di = gcd(ei - 1, D) 
for i = 1, 2,. . . , n, where gcd(a, b) denotes the greatest common divisor of a and b. After in- 
tercepting an authentication package P = {IDk, t, S, T} sent by another user uk, the password 
pwk = (Pwkl, Pwk2,. . . ,pkn) can be computed as follows. 
(1) Recover the random vector R = (T~,Q,. . . ,T,) from t by calculating ri = t mod di for 
i=l,2 )..., 72. 
(2) Compute the password PW, = (pwki,pwk2,. . . ,pWkn) Of the User u, a.5 fOllOWS: 
(pkl,pk2,... ,pwkn) = (s1,s2,...,%) - (nrT2,...,Tn) *.f(t, T). 
Then the user U’ can find any legal user’s password and he/she can login the computer system 
as another legal user. So Chang’s and Wu’s scheme is broken successfully. 
The key point of Chang’s and Laih’s attack is that the public information stored on smart 
cards supports a trapdoor to derive the secret information of the computer system. In the next 
section, we will propose a secure remote password authentication scheme with smart cards. In 
that scheme, even if the data stored on smart cards are read out, the secret information is still 
not released. 
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3. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME 
Since our scheme uses the Discrete Logarithm problem and Fermat’s theorem, we introduce 
them first. Next, we propose a new remote password authentication scheme. Finally, an example 
is given to illustrate the scheme. The Discrete Logarithm problem is described as follows. 
Discrete Logarithm Problem 
Given a large prime P and two integers 2, y which belong to the Galois field GF(P), does 
there exist a positive integer z (0 5 z _< P) satisfying that 2 = yz mod P? It is well-known that 
the Discrete Logarithm problem cannot be solved by any algorithm in polynomial time, if P - 1 
contains at least one large prime factor [12]. So, this is a very hard problem. Now we introduce 
the Fermat’s theorem. 
Fermat’s Theorem [ll, pp. 37-421 
Let P be a prime and A be an integer such that A and P are relatively prime. Then 
Ape1 E 1 (mod P). 
Suppose that the computer system selects a large prime P such that P - 1 contains at least 
one large prime factor, a primitive number cy of GF(P) and a secret nonsingular key matris K 
with n x n dimension as follows: 
where n is a positive integer and kij is an element of GF(P) for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let f be 
a public one way function, and g be a pseudorandom number generator function such that the 
value of g(z) is an integer less than P. The algorithm of g must be kept secret in order that 
anyone who knows the value of 2 cannot determine the value of g(z). The system computes a 
public key matrix PK with n rows and n columns as follows: 
where pkij = Q”I~ mod P for i,j = 1, 2 ,..., n. 
The new scheme can be divided into three phases: the register phase, the login phase, and the 
authentication phase. When a new user wants to be a legal one, he/she should submit his/her 
identity to the system in the register phase. The system will give the new user a smart card and 
a password through a secure channel. When a legal user wants to login the computer system, 
he/she has to insert his/her smart card and key in his/her identity and password. 
Register Phase 
Suppose that a new user Vi submits his/her identity IDi = (idil, idiz, . . . , idin) to the computer 
system. After receiving the identity IDi, the computer system executes the following steps. 
STEP 1. Compute the password PWi = (pwil, pw~, . . . ,pwi,) for the user Vi as follows: 
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where K-l is the inverse matrix of K. Since K is a nonsingular matrix, its inverse matrix exists. 
STEP 2. Deliver a smart card and the password PWi = (pwily wi2,. . . ,pwin) to the user Vi 
through a secure channel. 
The smart cards delivered to users are the same. Each smart card contains the following 
information: a key matrix PK and a one way function f stored on the ROM of each smart card. 
Login Phase 
Suppose that the user Vi wants to login the computer system. He/she inserts his/her smart 
card into the terminal. Next he/she keys in his/her identity IDi and the password PW,. 
following operations are then executed on his/her smart card. 
STEP 1. Generate a random vector R = (~1, ~2 , . . . , Tn), where Ti is an element of GF(P). 
STEP 2. Compute a vector S = (si, ~2,. . . , s,) as follows: 
The 
sm = fi (~lc,j)~j mod P for m = 1,2,. . . , n. 
j=l 
STEP 3. Compute PW’ = (pwi, pwh,. . . ,pu&) = PWi + (R * f(S, T) mod (P - 1)) = (pwil, 
PW2,..., Pwin) + ((Tlr TL?, . . . ,T,) * f(s,T) mod (P - I)), w h ere T is the login current date and 
time, and T is set by the smart card automatically. Note that here T represents a timestamp. 
STEP 4. Transmit the authentication message C = {IDi, PW’, S, T} to the system through 
networks. 
Authentication Phase 
After receiving the authentication message C, the system does the following steps to authenti- 
cate whether the login user is legal or not. Suppose that the system receives the message C sent 
from the user Vi at T’. 
STEP 1. Check whether the format of IDi = (idil, idis,. . . , idin) is correct or not. If the format 
of IDi is incorrect, then the user Vi has to be rejected. 
STEP 2. Test the time interval between T’ and T. If (T’ -T) is more than the legal time interval 
for transmission delay, the login request has to be rejected. 
STEP 3. Compute V = (~1, 212,. . . , v,) as follows: 
STEP 4. If &‘j = Cyg(idaj) * s:(~,~) (mod P) for j = 1, 2,. . . , TZ, then the system accepts the login 
user; otherwise, it rejects the login user. 
Why could the above equations CY”J E og(2dij) * s:(“~) (mod P), for j = 1, 2,. . . , n, hold? We 
can examine it carefully in the following. Since 
kjmw&, = 2 &(puri, + (rrn * f(S, T) mod P - 1)) 
= C kjmpwin + C (kjm * Tm * f(t, T) mod P - 1) 
m=l m=l 
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we can find that 
a vj _ ,g(&) .+ a~;=1 (k~,*~,*f(~,~) mod p-1) (mod p) 
= asWv) * Sf(SJ-) - 
3 
(mod P) for j = 1,2, . . , 7~. 
An example is given to illustrate the proposed scheme in the following. 
EXAMPLE 1. Suppose that the prime number P is 11, a primitive number cy = 2 over GF(11) 
and the secret key matrix K = 
5 4 . 
[ 1 2 3 IS a nonsingular matrix. Suppose that g(z) = x2 mod P. 
10 5 
The public key matrix PK = 4 
[ I 
8 . Now, we will show how the proposed scheme works. 
Register Phase 
Suppose that a new user Ua submits his/her identity ID3 = (i&r, i&2) = (7, 5) to the system. 
After receiving the identity I&, the system executes the following steps. 
STEP 1. Compute the password PW3 = (~~31, ~~32) for the user Us as follows: 
STEP 2. Deliver a smart card and the password PW3 = (~~31, ~~32) = ($, 5) to the user Ua. 
Note that a smart card delivered to each user contains the information: the public key matrix 
PK= ‘4” ; 
[ 1 and a one way function f on the ROM of the smart card. 
Login Phase 
Suppose that the user Ua wants to login the computer system. He/she inserts his/her smart 
card into the terminal. Next, he/she keys in his/her identity ID3 and password PWS. The 
following operations are executed by his/her smart card. 
STEP 1. Generate a random vector R = (r-1, 7-2) = (5, 8). 
STEP 2. Compute a vector 5’ = ( ~1, ~2) = (7, 5) as follows: 
81 = (Phi)” * (Ph2YZ mod 11 = lo5 * 5’ mod 11 = 7, and 
s2 = (Prc21)T1 * (Pk22Y2 mod 11 = 45 * 88 mod 11 = 5. 
STEP 3. Compute PW’ = (pw;, pw:) = PW3 + (R * f(S,T) mod P - 1) = (pw~, Pw32) f 
(CT17 7-2) * f(fT T) mod 10) = (($) + (5 * 6 mod 10) , ($) + (8 * 6 mod 10)) = (+, 8 $), where the 
timestamp T is the login current date and time and let f(S,T) = 6. 
STEP 4. Transmit the authentication message C = {IDS, PW’, S,T} = {(7,5), ($, 8 $) , 
(7, 5), T} to the system through networks. 
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Authentication Phase 
After receiving the authentication message C, the system does the following steps to authen- 
ticate whether the login user is legal or not. Suppose that the computer system receives the 
message C sent from the user Us at T’. 
STEP 1. Check whether the format of ID3 = (id 31, i&2) = (7, 5) is correct or not. Since the 
format of ID3 is correct, the system will do the next step. 
STEP 2. Test the time interval between T’ and T. Here we suppose that (T’ - T) is less than 
the legal time interval for transmission delay. The system will execute the following steps to 
authenticate the login user Us. 
STEP 3. Compute the V = (WI, ~2) = (4, 8) as follows: 
STEP 4. Since $1 f 237 E 7 s (yg(id31) * s{(~‘~) E 25 * 76(mod 11) and (~“2 z 227 E 7 3 
&7(G) * s {(S,T) E 23 .+ 56( mod 11) are both hold, then the system accepts the login user Vs. 
In the authentication phase, the system is sure that the login user Us is a legal one. In the 
next section, the security analysis will be given. 
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we are concerned about the following security problems: 
(1) Are passwords released from intercepted authentication messages? 
(2) Can the new scheme withstand replaying attacks? 
(3) Are the authentication messages forged by intruders to login the computer system suc- 
cessful? 
(4) Is the secret information secure? 
In the following, we will give some analyses for the above four problems. 
Since the channels among terminals and computer systems are insecure, could intruders derive 
the password of the login user from intercepted authentication messages? Before transmitting 
the authentication message, a smart card mixes the password PW and a random vector R to 
produce PW’, so there does not exist any relation between PW and PW’. Then there is no 
chance for intruders to derive the password PW from PW’. Therefore, intruders can not derive 
any password PW from his intercepted authentication messages. 
Could the replaying attack be executed successfully by intruders in our scheme? It is obvious 
that the timestamp T is also hidden in PW’ of the authentication message. Let the message 
C = {IDi, PW’, S, T} b e intercepted by an intruder. Suppose that the intruder replays the 
message at time T, and the computer system receives the replayed authentication message at time 
T’. If the intruder replaces the timestamp T by T, the equations &I E CY~(~~~J) * sf(S’T)(mod P) 
for j = 1, 2,. . . , n in the authentication phase will not hold. If the intruder uses the timestamp 
T, then T’ - T is more than the legal time interval for transmission delay, so the login request 
of an intruder will be rejected. Therefore, our scheme can protect from the replaying attack. 
Can intruders forge an authentication message C = {IDi, PW’, S, T} for any date and 
time T? Suppose that PW’ = (pwi, pwh,. ,pwk) and S = (~1, ~2,. . . ,s,). Obviously, 
the equations o?‘~ = &(idLJ) * s$(S’T)(mod P) for j = 1, 2,. . , n have to be satisfied. Since 
ag(id,,) * Sf(S,T) E &:=, k,-pw=+~;n=l b~~~nf(S,T) E &;=, h-P=‘:, (mod p), we find that 
Ci=, Ic,,&k = Cz=, kj,pw,, + Cz=, t&rd(S, T) for j = 1, 2,. . . , n. So pwk = 
pwim + s,f(S, T) for m = 1, 2,. . . , n. If the intruder gives S first, smf(S, T) can be calculated 
for m = 1, 2,. . . , n. In order to get PW’, the intruders would have to guess the password PWi. 
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Because P is a large prime number and there exist P” cases for PW,, the task of guessing PW’ 
is difficult for intruders. If the intruder determines PW’ first, there are also Pn cases for S. 
Forging S is also difficult for intruders. Owing to the above discussions, intruders have a difficult 
task to forge an authentication message for any given timestamp T. Therefore, intruders cannot 
forge an authentication message to login the computer system. 
Could a smart card holder obtain the secret key matrix K directly from the public key ma- 
trix PK of his smart card? The difficulty of this problem is equivalent to that of the Discrete 
Logarithm problem, since pkij = c&j mod P for i, j = 1, 2,. . . , n. Thus, it is very difficult to 
find K from PK for the intruder. So, the secret key matrix K cannot be obtained from the 
public key matrix PK. 
If a legal user Vi tries to get the secret key matrix K from his password PWi and the iden- 
tity IDi, he should solve the following equations: 
kll * PWil + kl2 * pi2 + . . . + kl, * pwin = g(idil), 
k21 *Pi1 + b2 * pi2 + . . . + kzn * PUJ~, = g(idi2), 
k TX1 * pwil + k,2 * PW~Z + ’ . . + k,, * pwin = g(idin). 
Each of the above equations has n + 1 unknown variables, so there are nP” possible cases that 
should be guessed. Since P is a very large prime number, finding the exact solution directly 
from the above equations is very time consuming. So, getting the secret key matrix K is a very 
difficult task for Ui. 
Can the above equations be solved with the cooperation of L legal users? It is obvious that if 
there are n + L unknown variables for each equation, the number of unknown variables will be 
increased if the number of legal users who cooperate with one another to solve the equations is 
increased. So, it also has no way to find a determined solution for the secret key matrix K. 
According to the above discussions and analyses, the secret key matrix K cannot be gotten 
from the public key matrix PK, and the password PW of each legal user could not be released 
from the intercepted authentication messages. The replaying attack cannot break our scheme, 
either. The authentication messages cannot be forged by an intruder. So our scheme is secure. 
Finally, we are concerned with the value n. While the value of n is increased, the number of 
possible solutions about CR=, kj,pw m = g(idj) for j = 1, 2,. . , n is also increased. From our 
discussions, we see that the larger the n is, the higher the security of our schemes are. However, 
the loads of transmissions in networks will be increased when n is large. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
A remote password authentication scheme is an important mechanism in a multi-user network. 
The computer system can use the schemes to support the privacy and security protection mech- 
anisms. In 1991, Chang and Wu proposed a remote password authentication scheme based upon 
the Chinese remainder theorem. In their scheme, each user can hold a smart card which is the 
same as the other smart cards held by others. As long as a holder can read the information from 
a smart card, he/she can easily find the secret encryption keys by applying Chang’s and Laih’s 
attack. So, Chang’s and Wu’s scheme is not secure enough. 
In this paper, we present a secure remote password scheme with smart cards. Though each user 
holds a smart card and some public information is put on the smart cards, the secret information 
cannot be released because the secret information is protected by a very hard problem, Discrete 
Logarithm problem. Owing that the new scheme can be against the replaying attacks, we have 
confidence that our proposed scheme is secure. 
The disadvantages of ours are: (1) the system needs a secure channel to deliver the secret 
password, and (2) the length of transmitted authentication message will be longer than that of 
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the corresponding transmitted authentication message by Chang’s and Wu’s scheme. Our next 
job is to investigate a way to allow the users to select their own identities and passwords freely, 
and to delete a legal user from the computer system easily. 
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